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Karlsson,  Loewenstein  and  Seppi  (2009)  found  that, following  market  downswings,
investors  are  less  likely  to  login  to monitor  their  retirement  portfolios.  They  concluded  that,
rather like (apocryphal)  ostriches  sticking  their heads  in  the  sand,  investors  avoid  unpleas-
ant  information  by reducing  portfolio  monitoring  in response  to news  of  negative  market
movement.  We  apply  generalised  non-linear  mixed  effects  models  to  test  for this  selective
information  monitoring  at an  individual  level  in  a new  sample  of  active  online  investors.  We
see different  behaviour  in  this  new sample.  We  ﬁnd  that investors  increase  their  portfolio
monitoring  following  both  positive  and  daily negative  market  returns,  behaving  more  like
hyper-vigilant  meerkats  than  head-in-the-sand  ostriches.  This  pattern  persists  for logins
not resulting  in trades  and weekend  logins  when  markets  are  closed.  Moreover,  an  investor
personality  trait  – neuroticism  – moderates  the pattern  of portfolio  monitoring  suggest-
ing  that  market  – driven  variation  in  portfolio  monitoring  is  attributable  to  psychological
factors.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
A standard assumption of the economics of information is that we should place value on information to the extent that it
serves as input to decisions that enable us to obtain desired outcomes. However, recent studies have suggested that we can
also value information for its own sake, and derive positive and negative utility directly from information. Loewenstein (2006)
discusses cases where individuals seek out or avoid additional information conditional on their expectations of how such
information will make them feel, independent of its informational value. For example, in the medical domain Loewenstein
et al. (2003) describe how people choose not to book an appointment to see a doctor in order to avoid receiving potentially
threatening information about their medical condition even if such information could potentially provide information that
would improve the quality of their health and wellbeing. Recent studies in neuroscience (Berns et al., 2006) show that regions
of the brain that are activated during the experience of a painful electric shock are also activated in individuals anticipating
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 0779 618 5347; fax: +44 0247 657 3127.
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he impending painful experience. The brain activation increases as the time of the shock approaches – behaviour consistent
ith the notion that the information that one is going to receive an electric shock is, like the shock itself, a source of misery.
ndeed, thinking about the shock was so unpleasant that subjects in this study preferred more pain – a higher voltage shock
 in order to reduce the time they spent dreading the impending shock.
As well as avoiding negative information people may  seek out and relish positive information. Ehrilch et al. (1957) found
hat owners who recently purchased cars were more attentive to advertisements for the model which they bought compared
o the other models they had considered buying. Similarly, Brock and Balloun (1967) found that smokers made more effort to
isten to pro-smoking messages than non-smokers, and non-smokers made more effort to listen to a message afﬁrming the
ink between smoking and lung cancer than smokers. The evidence indicates that, for both positive and negative information,
eople seek out or avoid information contingent on their expectation of its hedonic impact.
A recent study by Karlsson et al. (2009) has found evidence that people selectively seek out and avoid information in
 behavioural ﬁnance context. Given that the hedonic disutility of attending to bad news may  outweigh its informational
eneﬁts, Karlsson et al. (2009) built a model that brings together information acquisition and hedonic utility of information.
he model predicts that individuals rapidly seek out deﬁnitive information given positive news and avoid information in
he face of adverse news or in other words, that they will have asymmetric preferences for the timing and resolution of
ncertainty.
In their study Karlsson et al. (2009) explored two datasets. The ﬁrst dataset from the Swedish Premium Pension Authority
epresented Swedish citizens’ investments in equity and interest-bearing funds for their pensions aggregated across all
lients. The second dataset, provided by Vanguard Group, one of the largest investment management companies, aggregated
merican investors who primarily had personal 401(k) plans – retirement savings plans that can be invested into various
unds. In both datasets the authors found that investors selectively attended to information, as shown by portfolio monitoring
ncreasing with rising markets. Karlsson et al. (2009) reported evidence that investors check the value of their portfolios
ore frequently following positive market movements. In the US dataset prior averaged market return1 of 1% increased the
aily mean number of logins by 5–6% and in the Swedish dataset by 1%.
Borrowing from an earlier study by Galai and Sade (2006), Karlsson et al. (2009) termed this pattern of information
onitoring the ostrich effect. Galai and Sade’s (2006) identiﬁcation of the ostrich effect stems from their ﬁnding that the
eturn on liquid assets was greater than that on equally risky illiquid assets and that this difference in returns was higher in
eriods of greater uncertainty. Galai and Sade (2006) attributed this observation to investors’ willingness to pay a premium
or the “bliss of ignorance” (p. 2758). Under a standard economic account people should demand a higher return for the
lliquid assets, all other things being equal. The ﬁnding of the opposite pattern suggests that both because information about
osses is particularly painful, and because information about the performance of illiquid assets is less accessible, investors
re more willing to hold illiquid assets. Accordingly, Galai and Sade (2006) attributed investors’ preference for illiquid assets
ver equally risky liquid assets to the avoidance of potentially negative or uncertain information.
More recently, using the same dataset as Karlsson et al. (2009), Sicherman et al. (2013) have extended the analysis of
anguard clients’ (mostly 401k) accounts over the 2007–2008 period to an individual account-level introducing a non-
inear function (cf. Karlsson et al., 2009, who used a linear function) to relate market returns to logins to examine possible
ifferences between the effect of positive and negative returns. Sicherman et al. (2013) conﬁrmed the ostrich effect reporting
 signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on a “down Dow” dummy  variable which indicated whether the Dow index went down on
he previous day. However, they found no corresponding increase in monitoring when the Dow increased; in fact monitoring
lightly decreased across the range of positive returns. They conﬁrmed the ostrich effect for negative market returns at both
n aggregate and individual level; although many individual accounts had too few logins to enable detection of any effect,
bout 14% of their sample showed a signiﬁcant return/login relation and, of these, 79% of investors showed the ostrich
ffect, while 21% were “anti” ostriches as they had the opposite response to the market returns (increasing logins given
egative market returns). Moreover, consistent with the view that the ostrich effect has a psychological basis, Sicherman
t al. (2013) ﬁnd that ostrich behaviour is a relatively stable personal characteristic over time; individuals who  displayed
strich behaviour in 2007 were more likely to display ostrich behaviour in 2008.
In this study we test the effects of market returns on individual investors’ portfolio monitoring decisions in a new data
et. Our data set is from 617 UK private individuals investing in equities from 2004 to 2009, and contrasts with the Vanguard
nd Swedish Premium Pension Authority investors allocating into pension funds in 2007–2008. We  consider the effects of
ositive and negative daily market returns separately over a 6 year time period. To preview our results, like Karlsson et al.
2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013), we ﬁnd that login behaviour depends on market returns, but in our data the dependency
s quite different. Rather than the ostrich effect pattern, where people login less after recent negative market returns, we
nd what we term a meerkat effect in which people login more, not less, in response to recent negative returns – as well as
o positive returns.In attempting to understand why login behaviour should vary as a function of market returns we assume that investor
ogins may  be motivated by different intentions. They may login to trade or merely for portfolio information. Regardless
f a trader’s intentions both of these kinds of login could result in a trade – or not. In our modelling as well as considering
1 Karlsson et al. (2009) deﬁne prior averaged market returns as the log change in the index relative to the average index level over the previous 4 days.
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all logins, we also consider just the subset of logins that did not result in a trade. This is because although logins that did
not result in a trade do not necessarily reﬂect hedonic monitoring, these transaction-free logins can be considered more
likely to reﬂect informational portfolio monitoring. We  ﬁnd that, for such non-trade logins investors increase their portfolio
monitoring given both positive and negative daily market returns. To test this idea further we analyse weekend logins, days
when investors cannot transact. We  again ﬁnd investors increase their portfolio monitoring for both positive and negative
daily market returns – a meerkat effect. The fact that non-trade logins increase with positive daily market returns is consistent
with the idea that investors seek – and gain – hedonic utility directly from positive information. However our ﬁndings of
increased logins with negative market returns for daily non-trade logins and weekend logins are again the opposite of the
ostrich effect for negative market returns found by Sicherman et al. (2013).
Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013) propose that the ostrich effect is attributable to psychological factors, and
our study was originally planned to seek corroborative evidence for this notion by exploring the possibility of a link between
the psychological trait of neuroticism and individual differences in login behaviour. The personality trait of neuroticism is
associated with high levels of anxiety. While anxiety can be a mood or an emotion, trait neuroticism describes individual
differences in base-line levels of anxiety; indeed some authors refer to anxiety as a personality trait (Wilt et al., 2011).
Neuroticism is one of the major human personality traits identiﬁed in the ﬁve factor model of personality (Costa and McRae,
1992) and as more neurotic individuals experience greater anxiety and worry (Matthews et al., 2003), we  envisaged that
this would be reﬂected in their reactions to negative market returns. In order to investigate the psychological basis of the
ostrich effect, we construct a measure of the neuroticism personality trait for each investor and test whether investors’
level of neuroticism interacts with the effect of daily market returns on logins. We  hypothesise that there will be individual
differences in logins conditional on the daily market returns. The next section introduces our dataset, deﬁnitions of variables,
descriptive statistics and the generalised mixed effects model. Section 3 presents the results. In Section 4 we  introduce the
trait of neuroticism and its interaction with the meerkat effect. Discussion is presented in Section 5.
2. Dataset and methodology
2.1. Data and sample characteristics
We  study 617 clients from Barclays Wealth & Investment Management. For each client we  have their logins and trading
records over a 6 year period (2004–2009) and their self-reported demographics derived from a survey of the same 617
investors. The survey was conducted in a series of waves from September 2008 to December 2009 in order to explore
investors’ attitudes and disposition in relation to ﬁnancial markets that were of interest to Barclays Wealth & Investment
Management research objectives. As an incentive to participate in the survey respondents were promised a summary of
the research ﬁndings. Overall, such survey methodology has become an important addition to ﬁnance (Graham and Harvey,
2001; Lins et al., 2010).
In this study our sample of investors was selected based on the activity and wealth of individual investors. Those with
more than 1 trade per year and those with portfolio value of more than £1000 were invited to participate in the survey with
a total of 19,251 of their clients invited to take part in an online survey via 4520 clients opened the email and 849 proceeded
to the on-line questionnaire survey. 617 clients completed the survey, which is in the same range of response rate as in
similar studies by Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Glaser and Weber (2007).
Fig. 1 provides demographic distributions of the panel sample of our 617 investors who took part in the survey and
includes investors’ age, number of dependents, investable wealth, income and marital status and the demographic survey
questions. To identify potential selection biases, we  compared survey participants to an adult British population based on
the data reported by the Ofﬁce for National Statistics. Overall our 617 investors have above average incomes compared to
the British population; while the mean British income is around £30,000 our sample has a mean of £76,616 and a median of
£60,000. 84% of the sample are the prime ﬁnancial (investment and savings) decision makers of the household. The average
age of survey participants is 51 years, four years older than the average British adult. Survey participants are also more
likely to be married (0.74 vs. 0.52) or male (0.93 vs. 0.49) compared to the British average. Although our respondents are
not representative of the typical British adult, their demographics are in-line with private investor populations analysed in
other studies (Dorn and Huberman, 2005).
Fig. 2 plots the distributions of the daily market returns as measured by FTSE100 Index, the average daily number of
logins per investor and the daily average number of logins per investor excluding those logins that resulted in a trade, or
as we refer to, informational/hedonic logins. Investors in the sample login on 37% of the trading days. Fig. 3 is a raw scatter
plot of aggregate number of daily logins and daily market returns; the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing line clearly
indicates non-linearity in the data showing increased logins responses to both market gains and losses.
2.2. ModelsOur data allows us to measure investors’ portfolio monitoring behaviour at an individual rather than the aggregate level.
While we later describe analyses of logins that did not result in trades our ﬁrst analysis includes all trading day logins. All
models in this study include the full sample of 617 investors. Given that we have count data (the number of logins) we  use
a Poisson model and because we have repeated measures for each client we  use a mixed effects model. This Poisson mixed
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Fig. 1. Demographics distributions: investors’ age, number of dependents investors have, marital status, investable wealth and income. The survey questions
were  phrased as follows: How old are you? How many dependents do you have? What is your marital status? (Single; Married; Divorced; Widowed;
Cohabitating). What is the approximate total value of all of your investable wealth – your stocks, bonds, investment funds, derivatives and cash holdings?
What is your expected gross annual income for this year?
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Fig. 2. FTSE100 Index and logins distributions (trading days): FTSE100 Index ranging from January 2004 to December 2009 to match the transactions
data, average daily logins per investor, average daily logins per investor excluding logins that resulted in a trade. Daily Market Returns = (FTSE100
Price(t) − FTSE100 Price(t−1))/FTSE100 Price(t−1). Closing prices are applied.
effects model has random intercepts to account for each investor’s propensity to login to their portfolio and random slopes
to account for individuals’ sensitivity to daily market returns. To directly test the sensitivity of investors’ login behaviour to
changes in daily market returns separately for positive and negative domains, we  use two dummy  variables to indicate the
sign of daily market returns, one to indicate a positive return (Up-Dummy) and one to indicate a negative return (Down-
Dummy). We  control for days of the week, age, gender, income, marital status and whether the individual is the prime
ﬁnancial decision maker in the household. We  exclude weekends and holidays from the ﬁrst part of the analysis as the stock
market is closed therefore allowing us to focus on trading days; we consider weekend monitoring behaviour in a later section
3.5. We  ﬁt four models. The ﬁrst model uses daily market returns – returns between yesterday’s and today’s closing price
– as the independent variable. The second model uses a 5-day moving average of daily market returns and the third model
uses a 20-day moving average. The 5-day market return is the average of daily market returns for the week. For example if
today is a Wednesday, the 5-day returns calculation would include daily market returns on the last Thursday though today. A
similar method is used for the 20-day market returns calculation. It makes sense to look at market returns over several time
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tig. 3. Aggregate logins and daily returns: The scatter plot shows the aggregate number of daily logins of our sample of investors and the daily FTSE100
eturns with locally weighted scatterplot smoothing line.
eriods: a recent daily return, a week’s average return and a month’s average return could cause varied portfolio monitoring
ehaviour. The fourth model includes previous day’s logins since a login on Tuesday might not be independent from a login
n Monday. All four models gave very similar results.
. Results
.1. Daily market returns
The results in Table 1 show coefﬁcients from our four Poisson mixed effects models. Across all models there are more
ogins on Mondays and Tuesdays compared to the rest of the trading days (Friday was the baseline in our regressions). There
s also a signiﬁcant gender effect in all models with males logging in more frequently, which is consistent with Sicherman
t al.’s (2013) results. In Model 1, the signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient for the interaction between daily market returns and
he dummy  for positive returns (Returns × Up-Dummy) indicates that given an increase in daily market returns investors
onitor their portfolios more. The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient for the interaction between daily market returns and the
ummy  for negative daily market returns (Returns × Down-Dummy) indicates that the pattern is signiﬁcantly different in the
oss domain. Investors login more often with increasingly positive daily market returns and more, not less, after increasingly
egative daily market returns. We  call the increased monitoring as a function of increasing absolute daily market returns
he meerkat effect2 because investors increase their monitoring given changes. A t-test conﬁrms that the absolute steepness
f the slopes is signiﬁcantly different (p < 0.001) in positive and negative domains. In summary, investors increase portfolio
onitoring given both positive and negative daily market returns. The observed increase in portfolio monitoring given
ositive daily market returns is consistent with the ostrich effect; however, the increase in logins for negative daily market
eturns (relative to zero returns) is not consistent with what would be expected from an aversion to negative information.
.2. Past daily market returns
Model 2 replicates the analysis of Model 1, but replaces the daily market returns with the 5-day moving average, and
e ﬁnd the same signiﬁcant meerkat effect – that is increased portfolio monitoring for both positive and negative marketeturns. Model 3 uses a 20-day moving average instead of the 5-day moving average and again we  ﬁnd the same signiﬁcant
attern. Model 4 extends Model 1 by including a lagged login and it is consistent with the previous three models and shows
hat those investors who are more likely to login in the past are more likely to login today.
2 Typically one meerkat is on guard duty. Once faced with danger all meerkats come up and immediately begin jumping and growling.
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Table  1
Poisson models of all weekday logins.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Daily Ret p value 5-day Ret p value 20-day Ret p value Login lag p value
(Intercept) −1.004 0.007 −0.959 0.011 −0.949 0.011 −1.153 0.001
Monday 0.047 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.039 0.000
Tuesday 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.018 0.000
Wednesday −0.011 0.008 −0.009 0.023 −0.012 0.004 −0.012 0.004
Thursday −0.002 0.692 −0.007 0.096 −0.007 0.067 −0.002 0.592
Age  −0.004 0.383 −0.004 0.365 −0.004 0.361 −0.004 0.327
Decision maker −0.011 0.899 −0.011 0.901 −0.011 0.901 −0.014 0.867
Gender (male) 0.615 0.011 0.611 0.012 0.611 0.012 0.563 0.011
Income 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.027
Married −0.009 0.957 −0.007 0.965 −0.007 0.967 0.008 0.959
Divorced −0.149 0.596 −0.147 0.602 −0.146 0.603 −0.126 0.622
Widowed 0.109 0.803 0.114 0.794 0.115 0.794 0.181 0.651
Cohabitating 0.373 0.118 0.374 0.117 0.374 0.117 0.337 0.121
Returns × Up-Dummy 5.758 0.000 5.504 0.000
Returns × Down-Dummy −2.207 0.000 -1.567 0.000
Return  5-days × Up-Dummy 4.997 0.000
Return 5-days × Down-Dummy −1.669 0.000
Return 20-days × Up-Dummy 2.088 0.003
Return 20-days × Down-Dummy −4.620 0.000
Login 1 day lag 0.142 0.000
Marginal R2 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 3.0%
Conditional R2 48% 48% 48% 45%
Note: The marginal R2 describes the proportion of variance explained by the ﬁxed factor(s) alone. The conditional R2 describes the proportion of variance
explained by both the ﬁxed and random factors.3.3. Hedonic monitoring
When people login they may  do so with the intention of monitoring only or the intention of trading, and then once
logged in, then can trade or not. Thus we have a 2 × 2 table of scenarios: (i) intending to trade and then trading, (ii) intending
to trade but not trading, (iii) intending to monitor but then trading, and (iv) intending to monitor and then not trading. Of
course, unfortunately, we do not know the intention at login, only the result – either a trade or not. We  differentiate between
portfolio logins for trading purposes versus pure informational purposes to explore the psychological effects of information.
As non-trade logins can be considered more likely to reﬂect informational portfolio monitoring we  subtract days with logins
that resulted in a trade (trading days) from the dataset for each investor and conduct similar analyses as above to test the
relationship between login days not involving transactions and daily market returns. Karlsson et al. (2009) addressed this
issue by using the number of account logins less the number of portfolio reallocations in the Swedish dataset and aggregate
S&P 500 trading volume as a proxy to control for transactional logins in the Vanguard dataset. Sicherman et al. (2013) also
controlled for how much investors trade and performed analyses of weekend logins, which we  consider in a later section.
Table 2 reports results from our four non-trade logins Poisson models. The Returns × Up-Dummy coefﬁcients are, as
before, signiﬁcantly positive across all four model speciﬁcations suggesting investors’ increased demand for positive infor-
mation given rising markets. The fact that there are logins that do not result in trades is not, by itself, necessarily indicative
of hedonic monitoring. However the observed increase in non-trade logins as a function of rising markets does support the
notion that investors seek and obtain positive utility directly from information. Investors are more likely to monitor their
portfolio given rising markets.
Given falling markets, the signiﬁcant Returns × Down-Dummy coefﬁcient in Model 1 implies that in response to daily
market decreases, investors increasingly seek-out information; this is counter to the ostrich effect supporting our coining
of the term meerkat effect. Model 4, which is similar to Model 1, but includes a term to control for the inﬂuence of logins on
the previous day, also shows a meerkat effect. This model also shows that investors’ login decisions are not independent of
their logins the day before. However, Model 2 (the 5-day average return speciﬁcation) shows the opposite pattern for these
non-trade logins to that observed when logins involving trades were included. Instead of the meerkat effect there is a mild
ostrich effect, such that with increasingly negative returns fewer non-trade logins are made. This possibly reﬂects the fact
that because there is a larger proportion of logins that result in a trade when market declines (cf. Fig. 4) there would be fewer
opportunities for investors to record login days without trading over the 5-day period. Fig. 4 shows a plot of the proportion
of trades given a login across daily market returns and conﬁrms that in falling markets investors’ logins are increasingly
likely to result in transactions; for rising markets the increase in transactions per login is not so steep. Model 3 (the 20-day
return speciﬁcation) shows that when the market declined over the previous month, investor logins without trades do not
vary from their baseline level.
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Table  2
Poisson models of non-trades weekday logins.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Daily Ret p value 5-day Ret p value 20-day Ret p value Login lag p value
(Intercept) −1.297 0.001 −1.260 0.001 −1.253 0.002 −1.712 0.000
Monday 0.047 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.075 0.000
Tuesday 0.018 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.020 0.067
Wednesday −0.002 0.678 −0.002 0.724 −0.003 0.493 −0.015 0.166
Thursday 0.007 0.145 0.002 0.586 0.002 0.677 0.003 0.803
Age −0.003 0.570 −0.003 0.549 −0.003 0.544 −0.002 0.753
Decision maker 0.005 0.957 0.005 0.954 0.005 0.954 −0.015 0.868
Gender  (male) 0.604 0.018 0.600 0.019 0.600 0.019 0.566 0.022
Income  0.000 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.015
Married −0.002 0.989 −0.002 0.993 −0.001 0.994 −0.108 0.520
Divorced −0.111 0.708 −0.109 0.714 −0.109 0.714 −0.207 0.469
Widowed −0.055 0.905 −0.049 0.916 −0.049 0.916 −0.100 0.823
Cohabitating 0.409 0.103 0.409 0.103 0.409 0.103 0.195 0.421
Returns×  Up-Dummy 5.399 0.000 9.685 0.000
Returns× Down-Dummy −0.447 0.007 −2.104 0.000
Return  5-days × Up-Dummy 5.431 0.000
Return 5-days × Down-Dummy 1.828 0.000
Return 20-days × Up-Dummy 4.887 0.000
Return 20-days × Down-Dummy 0.376 0.638
Login 1 day lag 1.712 0.000
3
i
d
r
a
t
s
f
cMarginal R2 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 16%
Conditional R2 51% 51% 51% 57%
.4. Robustness tests
Because the system automatically logs-off inactive investors, multiple logins per day do not necessarily indicate a greater
nterest in portfolio monitoring; the most active investors could login just once and remain logged in – and monitoring – all
ay, while investors with a higher number of logins might be monitoring less and so being repeatedly logged out. For these
easons we tested a logit mixed effects model with a binary dependant variable for daily portfolio monitoring – measuring
 login if an investor logged into his account any number of times on that day or no-login if an investor did not login on
hat day. As previously, we ﬁtted four models for all logins (Table 3) and for non-trade logins (Table 4). Table 3 reports
imilar results to the Poisson models reported in Table 1 except that the returns and Down-Dummy interaction coefﬁcients
or Model 3 and Model 4 are non-signiﬁcant. Results of the non-trade logins logit regressions in Table 4 are similar to the
orresponding Poisson model speciﬁcations in Table 2 – except the returns and Down-Dummy interaction variable for Model
Fig. 4. The plot shows proportion of daily trades given a login for daily market returns with bars showing the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Table  3
Logit models of all weekday logins.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Daily Ret p value 5-day Ret p value 20-day Ret p value Login lag p value
(Intercept) −1.061 0.029 −0.991 0.041 −0.973 0.045 −1.430 0.000
Monday 0.063 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.039 0.000
Tuesday 0.040 0.000 0.049 0.000 −0.003 0.771 −0.012 0.010
Wednesday −0.001 0.885 0.002 0.843 0.041 0.000 −0.006 0.186
Thursday 0.004 0.689 −0.002 0.816 −0.002 0.862 0.003 0.477
Age −0.002 0.774 −0.002 0.742 −0.002 0.733 −0.003 0.487
Decision maker −0.022 0.847 −0.022 0.851 −0.022 0.850 0.000 0.999
Gender (male) 0.687 0.029 0.683 0.030 0.681 0.030 0.552 0.018
Income 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.028
Married −0.134 0.533 −0.133 0.536 −0.132 0.537 0.010 0.949
Divorced −0.276 0.450 −0.272 0.457 −0.271 0.458 −0.097 0.720
Widowed −0.149 0.794 −0.140 0.806 −0.138 0.808 0.010 0.982
Cohabitating 0.253 0.413 0.252 0.415 0.252 0.415 0.365 0.112
Returns × Up-Dummy 9.221 0.000 5.293 0.000
Returns × Down-Dummy −3.954 0.000 −0.050 0.768
Return  5-days × Up-Dummy 10.380 0.000
Return 5-days × Down-Dummy −1.839 0.019
Return 20-days × Up-Dummy 9.784 0.000
Return 20-days × Down-Dummy −2.805 0.111
Login 1 day lag 0.150 0.000Marginal R2 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 3.0%
Conditional R2 62% 61% 61% 48%
4 is non-signiﬁcant. Though some effects are not signiﬁcant over longer averaged returns the different criterion for logins
tested with the logit models does not change the overall pattern of effects we observe.
3.5. Weekend monitoring
Our second strategy for examining psychological effects of information is to use weekend logins. As the market is closed at
weekends we assume weekend logins will not be motivated by any intent to trade; with the exception of placing limit orders
and market orders for immediate execution once the market opens, investors will be restricted to monitoring. Accordingly
we investigated weekend logins using similar models as reported in previous sections. Treating the weekend as one period
Table 5 reports results for weekend logins regressed on the previous Friday’s returns using both Poisson and logit models
Table 4
Logit models of non-trades weekday logins.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Daily Ret p value 5-day Ret p value 20-day Ret p value Login lag p value
(Intercept) −1.295 0.009 −1.231 0.013 −1.221 0.014 −1.902 0.000
Monday 0.059 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.063 0.000
Tuesday 0.048 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.007 0.514 0.029 0.012
Wednesday 0.011 0.295 0.014 0.202 0.050 0.000 −0.003 0.792
Thursday 0.013 0.222 0.008 0.474 0.011 0.318 0.012 0.299
Age  −0.001 0.868 −0.001 0.836 −0.001 0.834 −0.001 0.834
Decision maker −0.008 0.949 −0.007 0.952 −0.007 0.953 −0.003 0.977
Gender (male) 0.662 0.039 0.654 0.041 0.653 0.042 0.539 0.035
Income 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.014
Married −0.132 0.547 −0.131 0.550 −0.131 0.551 −0.107 0.541
Divorced −0.246 0.510 −0.243 0.515 −0.242 0.516 −0.181 0.542
Widowed −0.260 0.655 −0.255 0.662 −0.253 0.664 −0.221 0.633
Cohabitating 0.279 0.378 0.278 0.380 0.278 0.379 0.225 0.371
Returns × Up-Dummy 8.683 0.000 9.311 0.000
Returns × Down-Dummy −2.105 0.000 −0.413 0.326
Return  5-days × Up-Dummy 11.080 0.000
Return 5-days × Down-Dummy 2.265 0.007
Return 20-days × Up-Dummy 12.500 0.000
Return 20-days × Down-Dummy 2.431 0.199
Login 1 day lag 1.675 0.000
Marginal R2 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 15%
Conditional R2 62% 62% 62% 57%
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Table  5
Weekend logins.
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Poisson p value Logit p value Poisson p value Logit p value
(Intercept) −2.212 0.000 −2.607 0.000 −2.172 0.000 −2.545 0.000
Age  0.008 0.088 0.011 0.036 0.008 0.093 0.011 0.040
Decision maker −0.003 0.967 0.011 0.908 −0.002 0.984 0.012 0.901
Gender  (male) 0.342 0.137 0.479 0.066 0.339 0.140 0.476 0.068
Income  0.000 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.011
Married −0.197 0.204 −0.180 0.304 −0.195 0.208 −0.179 0.306
Divorced −0.679 0.011 −0.668 0.026 −0.668 0.012 −0.665 0.027
Widowed −0.231 0.576 −0.279 0.550 −0.223 0.589 −0.272 0.560
Cohabitating 0.271 0.224 0.317 0.209 0.267 0.231 0.316 0.210
Returns × Up-Dummy 1.928 0.011 4.279 0.000
Returns × Down-Dummy −3.013 0.000 −4.835 0.000
Returns 5-days × Up-Dummy −5.481 0.002 −3.019 0.273
Returns 5-days× Down-Dummy −0.150 0.915 −0.058 0.979
Marginal R2 1.7% 1.8% 1.7% 1.8%
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Model 1a and Model 1b). For the logit model we measured a login if an investor logged into his account any number of
imes on that weekend (Saturday or Sunday) or no-login if an investor did not login on that weekend.
Across both models we ﬁnd support for the meerkat effect as investors signiﬁcantly increase monitoring given both
ositive and negative market returns. We  also used a similar strategy to test the effect of the previous week’s returns on
eekend monitoring behaviour in Model 2a (Poisson) and 2b (logit). The only signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for these two  models is a
egative signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the 5-day Return × Up-Dummy in Model 2a indicating that when the week is looking good
nvestors chose not to monitor at the weekend – counter to both the meerkat and ostrich effects. This ﬁnding is difﬁcult to
nterpret and different to what we have observed for the 5-day return on trading days – with or without excluding non-trade
ogins.
.6. Double weekend logins
If investors login and check their accounts on Saturday and then login again on Sunday, Sicherman et al. (2013) hypothesise
hey are doing this more for psychological reasons rather than purely to get additional portfolio information since prices
ave not changed. Accordingly, like Sicherman et al. (2013), we  investigated double weekend logins by ﬁtting a logit model
ith 1 = login happened consecutively on a Saturday and a Sunday and 0 otherwise. Results are reported in Table 6. A model
egressed on the previous Friday’s returns (Model A) shows a meerkat effect – double weekend logins increased for both
ncreasing and decreasing Friday returns. No signiﬁcant effects on double weekend logins were measurable based on the
verage market returns over the prior 5-day period (Model B).
able 6
ouble logins.
Model A Model B
Friday returns p value Week returns p value
(Intercept) −4.859 0.000 −4.826 0.000
Age  −0.004 0.661 −0.004 0.607
Decision maker 0.001 0.995 0.003 0.988
Gender  (male) 0.699 0.163 0.716 0.156
Income  0.000 0.016 0.000 0.014
Married −0.537 0.066 −0.485 0.100
Divorced −0.907 0.068 −0.826 0.098
Widowed −0.503 0.533 −0.403 0.619
Cohabitating 0.054 0.891 0.118 0.765
Returns × Up-Dummy 5.549 0.081
Returns × Down-Dummy −6.438 0.007
Returns 5-days × Up-Dummy −8.024 0.285
Returns 5-days × Down-Dummy −5.916 0.304
Marginal R2 2.7% 3.6%
Conditional R2 65% 65%
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things. I fear for the worst. I get stressed easily. Uncertainty makes me  uneasy, anxious or stressed.
4. Psychology of selective attention
4.1. Neuroticism
The psychological evidence that motives and expectations impinge upon human perception to the extent that people’s
attention and information gathering are inﬂuenced by the emotional content of information has been accumulating since
the 1940s. For example Postman et al. (1948) observed that individuals subconsciously raised the sensory thresholds for
the conscious recognition of “unacceptable stimulus objects” terming the phenomenon perceptual defence. Exploring this
phenomenon further McGinnis (1949) measured participants’ psychophysiological indicators (galvanic skin response) to
assess people’s emotional reactions and found that there was a selective emotional response to threatening stimuli – but
not neutral ones. McGinnis concluded that: “perceptual defence is designed to delay the greater anxiety that accompanies
actual recognition of the stimulus” (p. 250). Anxiety is directly associated with a trait of neuroticism (Matthews et al., 2003).
Trait neuroticism describes individual differences in base-line levels of anxiety; indeed some authors refer to anxiety as a
personality trait (Wilt et al., 2011). As earlier research has found that more neurotic people tend to be more perceptually
defensive (e.g. Watt and Morris, 1995) we hypothesise that the trait of neuroticism plays a role in portfolio monitoring
behaviour. At the time of planning this study we envisaged we would replicate the ostrich effect and then be able to measure
its association with neuroticism. Such a result would offer direct corroboration of Karlsson et al.’s (2009) suggestion, that
variation in portfolio monitoring with market returns is attributable to psychological factors. Although we have not replicated
the ostrich effect, the rationale for studying the relationship between personality and variation in portfolio monitoring with
market returns applies equally well to the meerkat effect. Indeed, some authors have proposed that the attentional system of
anxious individuals is abnormally sensitive to threat-related stimuli and that these individuals tend to direct their attention
towards threatening information (Williams et al., 1988).
4.2. Survey
The single measure of neuroticism was reported by the 617 investors as part of the survey questions collected by Bar-
clays Wealth Management. Although the survey was  conducted during turbulent ﬁnancial times, it is well evidenced that
personality traits are stable in adulthood and are seen as important inputs into social and economic outcomes by both psy-
chologists and economists (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2011; Heineck and Anger, 2010; Mueller and Plug, 2006; Nyhus and
Pons, 2005). In the survey, which is based on the ﬁve-factor model of personality inventory (Costa and McRae, 1992), each
investor responded on a 1–7 Likert scale (labelled 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”; 4 was  labelled “neither agree
or disagree”) to four personality statements. The resulting scores ranged from 4 to 28 points and then were scaled to have
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Table  7
Poisson and logit models of weekday logins with neuroticism.
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d
Poisson all
logins
p value Logit all
logins
p  value Poisson
non-trade
logins
p value Logit non-trade
logins
p  value
(Intercept) −1.005 0.007 −1.064 0.028 −1.298 0.001 −1.293 0.009
Monday 0.047 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.059 0.000
Tuesday 0.011 0.008 0.040 0.000 0.007 0.146 0.013 0.223
Wednesday −0.011 0.008 −0.001 0.886 0.018 0.000 0.048 0.000
Thursday −0.002 0.691 0.004 0.689 −0.002 0.673 0.011 0.295
Age  −0.004 0.416 −0.001 0.828 −0.003 0.596 −0.001 0.905
Decision maker −0.013 0.888 −0.025 0.832 0.004 0.964 −0.010 0.936
Gender  (male) 0.602 0.013 0.669 0.033 0.595 0.020 0.645 0.045
Income  0.000 0.027 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.012
Married −0.005 0.977 −0.128 0.550 −0.001 0.997 −0.127 0.561
Divorced −0.145 0.605 −0.269 0.461 −0.109 0.713 −0.241 0.518
Widowed 0.094 0.831 −0.172 0.763 −0.066 0.887 −0.279 0.632
Cohabitating 0.379 0.112 0.261 0.399 0.412 0.101 0.285 0.367
Neurotic −0.053 0.361 −0.091 0.224 −0.038 0.537 −0.075 0.326
Returns × Up-Dummy 5.727 0.000 9.235 0.000 5.380 0.000 8.696 0.000
Returns × Down-Dummy −2.219 0.000 −3.922 0.000 −0.456 0.006 −2.051 0.000
Returns × Neurotic × Up-Dummy −0.504 0.000 −0.516 0.161 −0.486 0.001 −0.431 0.272
Returns × Neurotic × Down-Dummy −0.364 0.008 −1.130 0.002 −0.781 0.000 −1.440 0.000
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 mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Fig. 5 reports the distribution of neuroticism and the survey statements used to
onstruct the measure.
.3. Personality results
We  apply similar analysis as in Section 3 using mixed effects with neuroticism added as a ﬁxed effect variable into the
odel. As a robustness check we carried out both Poisson and logit regressions. As before, we also consider models with all
ogins and models with logins that did not result in a trade separately. Table 7 reports results for four models using the daily
eturns speciﬁcation as in Model 1 in Section 3. The ﬁrst and second columns report Poisson and logit models respectively
ith all logins. The third and fourth columns report Poisson and logit models with logins that did not result in a trade. The
oefﬁcient for Neurotic is negative but non-signiﬁcant across all models, however of interest is the signiﬁcant interaction
etween neuroticism and negative market returns (Returns × Neurotic × Down-Dummy) across all model speciﬁcations;
he rate of increase in monitoring with negative market returns we characterise as the meerkat effect is more extreme for
eurotic investors.
For positive market returns all logins and non-trade logins show that the rate of increase in logins is gentler for more
eurotic investors. However this interaction is only signiﬁcant for the Poisson model speciﬁcations (Models 1a and 1c). Fig. 6
lots the ﬁxed effects of returns, neuroticism, and their interactions from Model 1a.
.4. Weekend monitoring and neuroticism
Conducting similar analysis as in the weekend monitoring section we ﬁnd that neurotic investors login signiﬁcantly less
n the weekends across all model speciﬁcation, however there are no interactions of neuroticism with market returns (see
able 8). We  also ﬁnd no interaction of neuroticism with market returns for double weekend logins. Given that neuroticism
nteracts with daily returns on weekdays, future research should explore the relationship between trading and the trait of
euroticism.
. Discussion
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that, as Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013) have claimed, individual investors do
ndeed selectively monitor their portfolios as a function of market conditions. However, our observations differ markedly
rom those described before. The Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension Authority datasets show that logins increase as
eturns move from negative to positive, whereas in our dataset portfolio monitoring increases as daily market returns move
way from zero in either direction, indicating that the ostrich metaphor is inappropriate for our data. That is, rather than
ecrease portfolio monitoring when market conditions are negative and increase monitoring when market conditions are
ositive, we ﬁnd that our sample of investors increased monitoring both when market conditions were positive and when
hey were negative. We  term this phenomenon the meerkat effect to highlight the contrast with the previous observations
524 S. Gherzi et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107 (2014) 512–526Fig. 6. Number of logins and daily market returns: The plot illustrates predicted number of logins as a function of daily market returns and highlights
effects of neuroticism, daily market returns and their signiﬁcant interaction. The upper line represents those who scored the lowest on neuroticism and
the  lower line represents those who scored the highest on neuroticism.
of reduced monitoring (as apocryphal meerkats stick their heads up to look around whenever something happens). Our
meerkats are logging-in to gain information (either to inform their decision making or for its own sake) and, unlike the
ostriches from the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension Authority data sets, do not avoid negative information. This
pattern of increased monitoring as a function of both increasing and decreasing daily market returns also holds when we
consider 5-day and 20-day moving averages for the daily market returns.
Our meerkat effect has an asymmetry, with logins increasing more for positive returns than negative returns (the asym-
metric V-shape in Figs. 3 and 6). One possible cause of this asymmetry, suggested to us by Duane Seppi, is that the differential
response to positive and negative market returns might be indicative of two  effects, one of which masks the other: an effect
on information monitoring that increases with changes in market returns in either direction and a hidden underlying ostrich
effect that somewhat suppresses monitoring when returns are negative. Despite the possibility of a latent ostrich effect, in
Table 8
Weekend logins with neuroticism.
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Poisson p value Logit p value Poisson p value Logit p value
(Intercept) −2.287 0.000 −2.696 0.000 −2.248 0.000 −2.640 0.000
Age  0.008 0.067 0.011 0.026 0.008 0.072 0.011 0.028
Decision maker −0.006 0.942 0.008 0.933 −0.005 0.955 0.009 0.926
Gender (male) 0.314 0.170 0.443 0.088 0.312 0.174 0.441 0.090
Income 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.008
Married −0.186 0.227 −0.166 0.342 −0.187 0.226 −0.168 0.335
Divorced −0.665 0.012 −0.654 0.029 −0.665 0.012 −0.654 0.029
Widowed −0.262 0.523 −0.310 0.504 −0.266 0.517 −0.318 0.493
Cohabitating 0.280 0.206 0.333 0.184 0.277 0.212 0.329 0.190
Neurotic −0.179 0.016 −0.212 0.011 −0.184 0.013 −0.224 0.008
Returns × Up-Dummy 1.955 0.035 4.293 0.002
Returns × Down-Dummy −3.033 0.000 −4.555 0.000
Returns × Up-Dummy × Neurotic 0.053 0.960 0.034 0.984
Returns × Down-Dummy × Neurotic −0.065 0.935 0.637 0.615
Returns 5-day × Up-Dummy −4.735 0.028 −1.867 0.559
Returns 5-day × Down-Dummy −0.657 0.698 −1.130 0.660
Returns 5-day × Up-Dummy × Neurotic 1.452 0.550 2.701 0.472
Returns 5-day × Down-Dummy × Neurotic −0.956 0.619 −2.560 0.397
Marginal R2 2.1% 2.4% 2.1% 2.3%
Conditional R2 45% 51% 45% 51%
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he plots of logins by daily returns there is, nonetheless, evidently a clear difference between the login behaviour we  report
ere and that found in the earlier studies showing an ostrich effect. For Sicherman et al. (2013, Fig. 9) this shows fewer logins
hen returns are negative and more logins when returns are positive. For us, the scatter plot in Fig. 3 shows more logins
or increasing positive and increasing negative returns. Even accepting that there may  be an underlying ostrich effect in our
ata leaves substantial differences between the data sets.
When we exclude those logins that involved trades from our dataset we again observe a meerkat effect – increasing
on-trade logins for both rising and falling markets – for immediate (daily) returns. However, for returns over a longer (5-
ay) time periods we found a different pattern for non-trade logins – they reduced for negative weekly market returns – an
strich effect. Nonetheless we again consistently observed statistically signiﬁcant meerkat-like increasing logins with both
p and down Friday market returns for weekend and double weekend logins when the markets are closed and investors
annot trade. Clearly the portfolio monitoring behaviour observed here is qualitatively quite different to that observed by
arlsson et al. (2009) conﬁrmed by Sicherman et al. (2013).
While there are differences between our data set and the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension Authority datasets,
e all ﬁnd that portfolio monitoring varies in relation to market movements. If, as Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman
t al. (2013) argued, the cause of variation in portfolio monitoring is psychological in nature then we  might expect to see
ome association with psychological characteristics of our investors. Consistent with this rationale we ﬁnd that the per-
onality trait of neuroticism accounts for the behavioural heterogeneity on an individual basis and interacts with daily
arket returns in predicting investors’ portfolio monitoring decisions. The more neurotic investors generally login less
ften than their less neurotic counterparts but, more interestingly, neuroticism interacts with the observed variation
n logins with daily market returns. Investors generally increased their logins for negative market returns but neu-
otic investors increased their logins more than non-neurotic investors. For positive market returns, as described above,
nvestors also generally increased their logins but neurotics were less responsive and increased their logins more gently
han non-neurotic investors. These ﬁndings corroborate the notion of Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013)
hat variation in portfolio monitoring is attributable to psychological factors–and this can be understood in terms of the
ifferent utility that different individuals may  experience from any anxiety arising from contemplating portfolio perfor-
ance.
Although our investigation focuses on the same behaviours as those studied by Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman
t al. (2013), we have noted that there are a number of differences between the datasets. Such results could be due to
ifferences between the samples studied across the two  studies – the Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al.’s (2013)
amples consisted of Swedish and USA nationals investing in their own  pensions, which might perhaps entail more critical
nvestments and with different time horizons than was  at stake for the present sample who were not directly investing for
heir pensions and may  have been involved in more discretionary trades. A clear difference in the behaviour of the samples
s evident when we compare the daily proportion of logins across the different datasets. From Karlsson et al.’s paper we can
nfer that the proportion of daily logins that consists of active investors in the US dataset was  about 2% and for the Swedish
ata was about 0.2% (Karlsson et al., 2009, Table 1), while in our sample the daily login base-rate is 37%.
Although Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013) gave evidence in support of the rationale for observing an
strich effect there is also evidence, cited by these authors, that people will sometimes hasten the experience of unpleasant
xperiences. In the introduction we referred to the study by Berns et al. (2006) who  observed that people preferred more pain
 a higher voltage shock – in order to reduce the time they spent dreading an impending shock. Of course the circumstances
f this study are rather different to those of investors exhibiting the ostrich or meerkat effects. Nonetheless it may  be
hat our investors who were likely trading over shorter time horizons than the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension
uthority investors were more likely to feel that they should get any bad news over with; while the Vanguard and Swedish
remium Pension Authority investors, trading for their pensions, might have felt more able to defer monitoring poor portfolio
erformance in the short term.
The present study is not the only research ﬁnding at variance with the ostrich effect. Brown and Kagel (2009) used
 trading laboratory experiment to test participants’ information acquisition behaviour. In their experiment participants
hose one of twenty stocks to hold in 8 trials with 20 periods in each trial. At the end of each round participants were given
he performance of their chosen stock and an option to view the past performance of the other nineteen stocks. Consistent
ith selective avoidance of negative information, the authors expected investors with losing stock to ignore the performance
f other stocks that were not chosen so as to avoid the fear and the regret associated with learning that they made the wrong
nvestment. However, their results indicate that, when holding a declining stock, a majority of participants sought more
nformation about the performance of the other stocks they could have invested into; but when holding a winning stock,
nly a minority of participants chose to look at the performance of the other un-chosen stocks.
In Brown and Kagel’s experiment, for a majority of decisions, participants chose to ignore information that could poten-
ially have led to higher earnings. Plainly, this trade-off of the informational value of information against its hedonic impact
aises questions about the implications of this phenomenon for ﬁnancial practice. In relation to the ﬁnancial markets Caplin
nd Leahy (2001) have even incorporated anxiety into the expected utility model and argued that it could account for the
quity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Similarly, Borghans et al. (2008) highlight
he importance of personality in predicting various social and economic outcomes including the labour market, crime, edu-
ational attainment, schooling decisions, health and longevity, and suggest that personality traits should be incorporated
nto conventional economic models. Likewise, we have shown the role of individual differences and their importance in
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information acquisition decisions. With regards to ﬁnancial markets, inconsistent information acquisition will be reﬂected
in prices; consequently understanding fully how people respond to information is clearly vital to being able to predict prices
and dynamics of the ﬁnancial markets and the economy.
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